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n order to explain the need for law and justice—concepts that regulate 
how an individual relates to other individuals and how a state relates to 
other states—philosophers like Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau have 
invented various social contract theories in the 17th and 18th centuries.   
Remarkably, Aristotle had the same project in mind even in the infant stages of 
Western philosophy.  In 1155a21-25 of Book VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics, he 
wrote:  
 
“Friendship seems too to hold states together, and 
lawgivers to care more for it than justice; for unanimity 
seems something like friendship, and this they aim at 
most of all, and expel faction as their worst enemy; and 
when men are friends they have no need of justice, while 
when they are just they need friendship as well, and the 
truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality.1 
 
In this passage, one can see how Aristotle regarded highly the concept 
of friendship.  For him, friendship—being one of the virtues just like truth, 
justice, courage, etc.—is something that affects not just human behavior but 
even the state’s as well .   However, the English language has set a limit to its 
use and thus diminished its meaning. While the Greek for friendship, which is 
φιλια can be translated as love,  when using the English language one cannot say 
that as A and B are friends, it must be that A and B are lovers.  But for the 
Greeks, A and B are friends, if and only if, A and B are lovers.  In fact, φιλια is 
where half of the word philosophy comes from.  Why is it that even when tracing 
the etymology of philosophy, one uses “love of wisdom” instead of “friend of 
wisdom?”  This is not the case for Aristotle.  Aside from just regarding highly 
friendship by considering it as affecting the individual and the collective’s 
behavior toward others, Aristotle goes further by claiming that friendship is a 
necessary ingredient, not just to have an orderly life and state, but in order to 
have a eudaimon life, i.e., a happy life.  Thus, for Aristotle, without friendship, a 
person cannot be happy. 
                                                 
1 Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. II, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press,  1984).  For my future citations of the Nicomachean Ethics, I will use the 
abbreviation NE, followed by the Bekker number. 
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In this paper, I will be comparing two arguments forwarded by 
Aristotle in Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics that dealt with friendship.  I 
believe that, by analyzing side by side the two arguments, we shall have a 
general understanding how Aristotle’s idea of φιλια
2 works with ευδαιμονια.  By 
taking into consideration Aristotle’s premises in both arguments, which contain 
the notion of a friend as other self, this paper hopes to answer the question 
whether friendship is egoistical or altruistic. 
The conclusions of the two arguments are as follows: 
 
(I)  Δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων.
3  
 
A happy person needs friends. 
 
(II) Δεήσει ἄρα τῷ εὐδαιμονήσοντι φίλων σπουδαίων.
4 
 
A person who is to be happy needs good friends. 
 
While the first conclusion points out that the person who is in need of 
friends has achieved already a life that is happy, which I believe is better 
captured by the word successful or prosperous and therefore abundant in internal 
and external goods, the second conclusion points to a person who is still about 
to be successful, which is contained in the Greek word εὐδαιμονήσοντι 
(εὐδαιμονέω) which means “to be happy, or to be prosperous.”
5   However, it 
seems that while the person who is already successful needs an inclusive kind 
of friendship, a person who is about to be one is rather more selective by 
limiting her need to virtuous friends, which captures the original σπουδαίων, 
which literally means “good or excellent.”
6   Such is the reason why as the first 
argument shows how a person who is already prosperous still needs friendship 
from people who are in adverse situations, thus focusing on the mutual utility 
that exists between them; the second argument focuses on the essential role 
that virtuous friends play in order for someone’s life to be successful.   
Although I believe that there is a much deeper reason why Aristotle placed the 
two arguments one after another, my objective in presenting side by side the 
arguments is to show only how in both cases Aristotle used the concept of a 
happy life with that of a friend as other self. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 All Greek texts are from Ingram Bywater, ed., Aristotelis’ Ethica Nicomachea (Oxford:  
Clarendon Press, 1894), unless noted otherwise. 
3  NE, 1169b22. 
4  Ibid. 1170b18-19. 
5  George Liddel and Robert Scott, Intermediate Greek-English  Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1889).  
6  Ibid.  
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Aristotle’s Dilemma 
 
The First Argument 
 
Aristotle argued in the Nicomachean Ethics, 1169b1 - 22 that a happy 
person needs friends because: 
 
1.  If it is external goods that make a person self-
sufficient, then we should consider friends as 
necessary because they are supposed to be the 
greatest of all external goods.7 
 
2.  A friend is another self who furnishes what one 
cannot get for himself.8 
 
3.  It is better to do good to friends than strangers.  This 
is why people who lack in means need prosperous 
friends in times of adversity, and prosperous people 
need friends who lack in means in times of 
prosperity.9  
 
4.  A person is a political creature and it is his nature to 
live with others for he has the things that are by 
nature good.10  
 
5.  It is better to spend his remaining days with friends 
than with strangers.11 
 
For Aristotle, every person’s aim should be to attain happiness.  By 
happiness, Aristotle does not mean an emotion of cheerfulness or good feeling.  
For him, happiness can either be a life characterized by full of pleasant 
activities or a life which have reached its full potential.  This is the reason why I 
believe that to have a happy life is to have a prosperous life.  A person who is 
prosperous necessarily carries with it a certain notion of abundance and 
independence.  As such, for Aristotle, a happy person is necessarily a self-
sufficient person.  However, there is a problem with this notion of self-
sufficiency.  Aristotle even pointed out a seeming paradox in the first argument 
that if self-sufficiency means not lacking in all internal or external goods, then 
how can a life that is deemed complete be in need of friendship?   
Aristotle argues that by having attained the self-sufficient state, a 
person who has all the goods of life will do things that are pleasant and good 
                                                 
7 NE, 1169b1-10. 
8  Ibid., 1169b6. 
9 Ibid., 1169b10-16. 
10 Ibid., 1169b17-18. 
11 Ibid., 1169b10-16.  
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because they are beneficial, either to herself or to her friends.  As such, things 
done for the benefit of friends are always pleasant.  In this section, Aristotle is 
emphasizing the usefulness of having a self-sufficient person as a friend 
because she possesses the goods that can help out friends in their time of 
difficulty.  Aristotle pointed out that a person who is prosperous or abundant 
in external goods is in a better position to help people who are in need.     
Necessarily virtuous, this person is always desirous of helping out friends in 
times of their adversity.  By friends here, I believe he refers to friends in a 
much broader sense, inclusive of people who are not equal in stature, like a 
son, a wife, a neighbor, or probably a junior colleague but also friends who 
have achieved similarly a life of self-sufficiency.  Aristotle believes that a self-
sufficient person is very much in demand in times of distress because it the 
time that she is mostly beneficial. 
 
The Second Argument 
 
In passages 1170a15—b18, Aristotle shifts from portraying friendship 
as a relationship between someone who is useful to a relationship between 
someone who desires and someone who is to be desired.  By pointing out that 
life is an activity comprised of perceiving and thinking, a person is able to 
perceive and think of what is pleasant and good.  In fact, life or existence itself 
is pleasant and good because of these powers to think and perceive.  This is 
why Aristotle argues that any virtuous person will recognize that existence or 
living is the most valuable thing for a person to have.  However this is not true 
for people who are so corrupted or wicked that they have a low regard for 
human life; similarly to people who are in pain and would want life to be over.  
As such a virtuous person is desirable as a friend because she would value her 
life and the life of her friend, being an extension of one.   For Aristotle, because 
living is naturally desirable, a friend who values life is also naturally desirable.  
This is the reason why if someone who is on her way to success will not be 
able to acquire what is naturally desirable, then it would be a life that is 
incomplete.  Ergo, it is a life that will never be happy.  This is the reason for 
Aristotle concluding that someone who is to be happy needs virtuous friends.   
I have enumerated the premises of the second argument as follows: 
 
1.  Life which is essentially perceiving and thinking is 
good and pleasant in itself.12   
 
2.  A virtuous person desires to live a life that is pleasant 
and good for him unlike for someone who is corrupt 
and in pain.13 
  
                                                 
12 Ibid., 1170a15-20. 
13 Ibid., 1170a20-30.  
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3.  If life is good for oneself, then surely the life of a 
friend is pleasant for that one also because a friend is 
another self.14  
 
4.  Because life is constant perceiving, a person 
necessarily perceives one’s existence and the 
existence of friends by living together and sharing in 
discussion and thought.15 
 
5.  If life for a good man is naturally desirable and 
perceiving that a friend’s life is similarly good, then a 
friend also is naturally desirable.16  
 
6.  What a person desires he must have or he will be 
lacking in whatever he does not have.17 
 
These two arguments that I have mentioned include remarkably the 
concept of a friend as another self.  I believe that this concept captures the very 
nature of why we like or have φίλια in the first place.   However, the problem 
with this concept of other self is that it makes Aristotle idea of friendship 
egoistical or selfish in motivation.  So before I move on and analyze the two 
arguments which contains the concept of other self, I will discuss a rather 
different emphasis in defining friendship; one that is based on the idea of well-
wishing for the sake of the other. 
In his article Aristotle and the Forms of Friendship, after giving the three 
forms of friendship, which are pleasure friendship, advantage friendship, and 
character friendship, John Cooper argued that well-wishing for a friend’s sake is 
found in all three forms.   He argued that instead of well-wishing to be something 
to be hoped for a friend in the future, well-wishing is done in retrospect of a 
character of a friend or the properties of friendship.  He used  διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, 
which is found in 1156a4:  “To be friends, then, they must be mutually 
recognized as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each other...”  He pointed 
out that Aristotle used διὰ in order to show an antecedent causal condition.  
He wrote: 
 
Understanding the because in this causal way makes it at 
least as much retrospective as prospective; the well-
wishing and well-doing are responses to what the person 
is and has done  rather than merely the expression of a 
hope as to what he will be and may do in the future.18 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 1170b1-8. 
15 Ibid., 1170b9-13. 
16 Ibid., 1170b14. 
17 Ibid., 1170b15-19. 
18  John Cooper, “Aristotle and the Forms of Friendship,” in The Review of Metaphysics, 
30:4 (June, 1977), 633.  
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Cooper believed that well-wishing for the sake of the other can be found in 
all three forms of friendship.  As such, friendship based on mutual use, and 
advantage, just like friendship based on character or the virtues are all based on 
well-wishing.  However, he qualified that well-wishing in the much temporal kind 
of friendship, which is based on pleasure and advantage, is different from an 
essential kind, which is based on character.  He pointed out that because 
friendship that is based on what is pleasant and advantageous only exists 
because of the pleasure and advantage mutually gained from it, a friend will not 
wish well a friend to the point that pleasure and advantage gets lost in the 
process.   For him, friendship based on instrumentality can only wish-well for 
what is best for the other to the point of still retaining common pleasure and 
advantage.  To this effect, he stated: 
 
In short, in wishing someone well, for his own sake, 
because he is pleasant and advantageous, one’s first 
commitment is to his retention of the property of 
pleasantness and advantageousness, and any good one 
wishes him to have, for his own sake, must be compatible 
with the retention of that special property under which, as 
his friend, one wishes him well in the first place.19 
 
However, there is another friendship that is based on something 
lasting and not limited to the retention of what is pleasant and advantageous.  
Cooper pointed out that there is a well-wishing that is based on the character 
of a person.  For him, a person’s character is essentially who that person is.  
Thus, when one wishes for what is good for a character friend, it is a wish for 
what is the best for that friend.  Cooper argued that this is the only kind of well-
wishing that is truly disinterested.  Unlike the two kinds that limits one’s wishing-
well to the retention of pleasure and advantage, the kind that is based on 
character becomes limited only to what is best for that person.  However, as 
we will see later, this is similar to the concept of other self.  The friend as other self 
also ceases when pleasure and advantage also cease, and in the case of 
friendship based on character, the idea of a friend as other self will only cease 
when the life of the person ceases. 
John Cooper believed that for Aristotle, based on the relationship 
between the three kinds of friendship and one’s wishing-well for the sake of 
the other, friendship is not motivated only by self-interest.  He quoted 1156a3-
5, which states in the original:  δει̂ ἄρα εὐνοει̂ν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ 
μὴ λανθάνοντας δι' ἕν τι τω̂ν εἰρημένων.   For him, all kinds of friendship 
have “εὐνοια for one another.”
20 And this is where the entire thesis of John 
Cooper is hinged upon. 
                                                 
19  Ibid., 636-637. 
20  Ibid., 644.  
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My problem with this interpretation is that it focused too much on the 
concept of the supposed distinguishing characteristic of friendship that is 
wishing-well for the sake of the other.  I do agree that this definition is consistent 
with how Aristotle described friendship.   Aristotle consistently argues that a 
good or virtuous friend will always wish for what is best for the other.   This is 
the reason why for Aristotle a friend who is virtuous is the only one capable of 
being a true friend, which as John Cooper pointed out as character friendship.   
Although, friendships based on pleasure and advantage also wish well, to some 
degree it has its limitations.  This, on the other hand, is the difference between 
incidental friendships and character friendships.  In the Rhetoric, Aristotle wrote:  
“We may describe friendly feeling towards anyone as wishing for him what you 
believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his, and being 
inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about.”
21  If someone who is 
to be happy desires virtuous friends because these virtuous friends are capable 
of wishing what is good for a friend even without retaining pleasure and 
advantage, doesn’t the person who is to be happy treating them as also as 
means to achieve an end, because by acquiring them one can achieve 
happiness?  This is the other side of the coin that John Cooper did not discuss 
in his paper, thus presenting a rather not self-motivated view of friendship.  I 
believe that the concept of well-wishing for the sake of the other should be tempered 
by the concept of a friend as another self.    In a way, both approaches will arrive 
at the same thing, and yet the illusion that there is no selfish-motivation in 
friendship is avoided.  What my theory holds is that friendship is foremost 
based on love of self, but by introducing the concept of other self and the act of 
wishing well, Aristotle becomes egoistical and yet altruistic at the same time.   
This is the reason why a true friend will always think of what is best for the 
sake of the other, i.e., to make a friend’s existence pleasant and good.  Not only 
because it is beneficial to do so but because to harm a friend is the same as 
harming oneself. 
 
Aristotle’s Solution 
 
  A happy person needs friends 
 
It is also disputed whether the happy person will need 
friends or not.  It is said that those who are supremely 
happy and self-sufficient have no need of friends; for they 
have the things that are good, and therefore being self-
sufficient they need nothing further, while a friend, being 
another self, furnished what a person cannot provide by 
her own effort; whence the saying, ‘When fortune is kind, 
what need of friends?’  But it seems strange, when one 
assign all good things to a happy person, not to assign 
                                                 
21  NE, 1380b36.  
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friends, who are thought the greatest of external goods.
22
  
The first argument differs from the second, in that while the second 
emphasizes the need for virtuous friends for a person who is about to be 
successful, the first focuses on the usefulness of a person, who is self-
sufficient, to her friends. But what is remarkable in the first argument is that it 
captures why friends are considered as the greatest of the external goods, 
because people can be used in order to achieve a goal or purpose.  By being an 
instrument, friends can be used to do things that one has a hard time doing.  
However, the question that comes to mind is who is using whom?  In the case 
of the happy person and her friends, who would benefit the most?  Although 
Aristotle wrote that “it is better to do good to friends than strangers,” it is 
easier for a person to accept that one is being used by a stranger than a friend.  
In this case, there may be a difference between being used and doing 
something beneficial.  By being used as a means to an end, this may mean not 
necessarily involving awareness both in the one using and the one being used.  
However, in the case of doing what is beneficial to a person, there is an 
assumed involvement of intentionality.  Although this does not discount that it 
is also good to do pleasant things to strangers, to do pleasant things to people 
one knows is better.  Furthermore, it is in this argument that Aristotle asserted 
that we need friends the most, in times of adversity.  As such, the passage is 
not only about a happy person who is in need of friends, the matter about 
prosperity or adversity shows that one’s need of friends pertains to the basic 
need of people to have successful friends in times of need.  This is why a 
person in an adverse situation needs friends who are self-sufficient.  However, 
there is the usual other side of the coin: for Aristotle people of means, 
especially in times of prosperity, also need people who are in need of friends.  
Thus if we would premise that one needs friends in times of adversity, we 
should accept also that one needs friends also in times of prosperity. 
This is the reason why, I think that Aristotle asked the question, “Why 
would a self-sufficient person be in need of friends?” If he asserts that a person 
who is happy does not need anything, then that person has no need even for 
friends.  If he asserts that in order for a person to be happy, friends are 
necessary, then it does not only show that a person is not only in need of 
something but most of all unhappy because of the presence of such a need.   I 
believe that this problem stems from the idea that we equate self-sufficiency 
for not desiring anything else.  This is the reason that Aristotle pointed out that 
of all the external goods to be desired human beings are the greatest of all.  If 
we are to fill our lives with goods in order to be self-sufficient, we should fill 
our lives firstly with friends.  Another possible solution is for Aristotle to either 
show that a person can be successful even without the help of other people or 
he can assert that friends are just the product or the result of being 
accomplished.  Well, what if that person who achieved the eudaimonia will not 
have any friends?  In order to be consistent with the concept of success that is 
                                                 
22  Ibid., 1169b1-5.  
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achievable even without the aid of friends, one can say that a person should 
still remain in that state of happiness in spite of a solitary condition.  For 
Aristotle, this is simply untenable. 
 
Surely it is strange, too, to make the supremely happy 
person a solitary; for no one could choose the whole 
world on condition of being alone, since person is a 
political creature and one whose nature is to live with 
others.  Therefore even the happy person lives with 
others; for he has the things that are by nature good.  And 
plainly it is better to spend her days with friends and good 
men than with strangers or any chance persons.   
Therefore the happy person needs friends.
23 
 
By pointing out that because a person is “a political creature whose 
nature is to live with others,”   Aristotle points out that it is by nature that a 
successful person will not give up being with other people in exchange for all 
the external goods of life.   Despite being self-sufficient, a happy person will 
even allow herself to be friends with people who are not equally in her league.  
Furthermore, because she is in a position to help out a needy friend in times of 
adversity, she would be willing to share her material resources in exchange of 
being actively involved in the lives of other people.  This is consistent with the 
definition of eudaimonia as an activity, not an object to be acquired.  In 1170a1 
Aristotle wrote: “For we have set at the outset that happiness is an activity; and 
activity plainly comes into being and is not present at the start like a piece of 
property.” This is the reason why, a man who is already flourished will still 
need friends, i.e., to continue flourishing.   As the happy man benefits from 
friendship by making her flourish more, the friend, by providing company, also 
benefits from her riches in times of need.  The happy person and the person 
benefitting from such friendship, as such become instrumental goods to each 
other.   
Aristotle mentioned two kinds of external goods: instrumental and 
intrinsic goods.  He wrote: “Of the remaining goods, some are necessary and 
others are naturally co-operative and useful as instruments.”
24 For Aristotle, 
friends can be either instrumentally or intrinsically good.  As such some would 
describe Aristotle’s striving for happiness and use of friends as self-centered.  
This is the usual portrayal of a person seeking eudaimonia in Aristotle’s works, 
i.e., someone who is egoistical and seeking only what can be acquired in order 
to achieve a happy life.  Well, this is understandable because ultimately, it is the 
self who is responsible for one’s happiness.  However, although selfishness 
seems to be unavoidable in order to be happy, real life will tell us that seldom a 
person would like to be used, unless maybe if there is mutual utility.  As such 
Aristotle wrote: “In many actions we use friends and riches and political power 
                                                 
23  Ibid., 1169b15-20. 
24  Ibid., 1099b25.  
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as instruments.”
25 However, this is not the emphasis of the first argument.  In 
the passages 1169b1–20, the one who is the instrumental good is the happy 
person for he is the one who is in the position to help out her friends who are 
in need.   Aristotle wrote in Book VIII:  “For without friends no one would 
choose to live, though he had all other goods; even rich men and those in 
possession of office and of dominating power are thought to need friends most 
of all; for what is the use of such prosperity without the opportunity of 
beneficence, which is exercised chiefly and in its laudable form towards 
friends?” 
26 In this case, it is the happy person who is allowing herself to be 
used in order to be of benefit to her friends.  However, does the self-sufficient 
person really believe that she is just being used?  Aristotle by providing the 
statement “a friend is an extension of the self;” the self-sufficient friend, as a 
true friend, will not even think that she is being used because in principle the 
person that she is helping is a part of her. Granted that there is mutual utility, 
what the happy person gets is that she is able to satisfy her nature as a political 
creature and enjoy the company of her friends. 
 
A person who is to be happy needs virtuous friends 
 
But how can having virtuous friends lead a person to have a happy 
life?  Aristotle in the NE mentioned three kinds of friends.  In 1155b15—
1156b5, Aristotle mentioned friends who are useful, pleasant, and excellent.  
The first two kinds of friends for Aristotle do not last.  These friendships exist 
as long as there is mutual pleasure and utility.  Once pleasure and utility are 
gone, so does friendship.  Aristotle wrote: “...these friendships are incidental; 
for it is not as being the person he is that the loved person is loved, but as 
providing some good and pleasure.  Such friendships then are easily dissolved, 
if the parties do not remain like themselves; for if the one party is no longer 
pleasant or useful the other ceases to love him.”
27  On the other hand there is a 
kind of friendship that is based on the virtue of excellence.  This kind of 
friendship, instead of thinking of a person’s use or pleasure, thinks of what is 
good for the sake of the other.  For Aristotle, this is the kind of friendship that 
lasts.  According to Aristotle: “ Now those who wish well to their friends for 
their sake are most truly friends; for they do this on reason of their own nature 
and not incidentally, therefore their friendship lasts as long as they are good—
and excellence is an enduring thing.” 
28  
However, Aristotle recognized that although this kind of friendship is 
not based on utility or pleasure, such friendship is still pleasurable and useful.  
If friendship that is based in excellence can be a means of pleasure and utility 
then the conclusion for passages 1170a10—b 15 captures more accurately the 
role that the virtues play in friendship, i.e., people who possess them make the 
                                                 
25  Ibid., 1099b1. 
26  Ibid., 1154a5. 
27   Ibid., 1165a15. 
28  Ibid.., 1156b10.  
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best kind of friends.   Aristotle argues that, for someone who spends life 
thinking and perceiving, this is hard to miss.  Thus, a person who values her 
own existence would necessarily notice the excellence that virtuous people 
possess.  As such, this would lead someone to desire virtuous persons as 
friends, because their friendship is based on excellence; and most of the time 
we see this property of excellence easily in other people than ourselves.  As 
such, given an option whether to choose someone who is virtuous or someone 
who is corrupt, Aristotle is saying that a person will always choose what is good 
and pleasant.  The Greeks also have in mind that the men with virtues are the 
only ones capable of friendship, which can be seen echoed in Plato’s Gorgias, 
507d-508a: 
 
...a person who wants to be happy must evidently pursue 
and practice self-control...  He should not allow her 
appetites to be undisciplined or undertake to fill them 
up—that’s interminably bad—and live the life of a 
marauder.  Such a person could not be dear to another 
person or to a god, for he cannot be a partner, and when 
there is no partnership there’s no friendship.
29 
 
For the Greeks, one pursues the virtues first and then has real friends 
as consequence.  Aristotle has this view that virtue is not some exemplary 
character trait that is bestowed by the gods but is developed through practice 
and time by a person until it becomes a matter of habit.  An example of this is 
a person starting from childhood learns how to be fair while playing games 
with friends, and later on as he matures learn how to be fair in her business 
deals, etc.    As such, virtuous people are capable of true friendship because 
they have proven themselves how to be good friends, which they develop 
through time, thus the passage: “such friendship requires time and familiarity; 
as the proverb says, ‘men cannot know each other till they have eaten salt 
together; nor they can admit each other to friendship or be friends till each has 
been found lovable and been trusted by each.” 30   This is the reason why a true 
friend is pleasant and good in itself, because it is rare.  Furthermore, Aristotle 
said “If we look deeper into the nature of things a virtuous friend seems to be 
naturally desirable for a virtuous person.” 31  Also, by choosing the virtuous 
person as a friend, someone is assured that one’s choice is mutually desirable 
because a virtuous person will always consider what is also good and pleasant 
to a friend.  Why?  This is where Aristotle’s idea that “a friend is another self” 
comes in.     As other self, the person will always choose what is pleasant and 
good for her own extended self—unlike for someone who is corrupt or in 
pain.   Aristotle puts forward that if one cannot satisfy this desire, a person can 
                                                 
29  John Cooper, ed., The Complete Works of Plato (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 
1994).  
30  NE, 1157b30. 
31  Ibid., 1170a15.  
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never be self-sufficient because that person will always be lacking. This is the 
reason why a person who is to be happy should be able to fulfill this need. 
I believe that the task of the second argument is to present a kind of 
friendship that much different from those that are based on utility and 
pleasure.  Aristotle pointed out that there is a kind of friendship whose basis is 
the liking of a person’s character, and eventually the person itself.  John Cooper 
calls this character-friendship.  This is what Aristotle calls friendship based on 
excellence.  However, even if the idea of liking a person because of character is 
not that hard to see, the second argument has, for John Cooper, a major flaw.  
He wrote: 
 
But until we are given some independent reason for 
thinking that the good man will need or want to form 
friendships in the first place, we are not entitled to 
assume that he will have the sort of attitude toward any 
other person which will enable him to get this pleasure 
and, in consequence, desire this close association.  But 
there is not the slightest hint in this argument, so 
interpreted, of any reason for thinking this.32 
 
For him, there was no reason given in the argument to even suggest 
why a person should be liked as a friend.  He argued that the premise a friend is 
another self does not seal the deal.  The argument that a person will be liked as a 
friend because similarity in character is perceived and judged on the basis of 
one’s own character, for him, is not as convincing as arguing from beneficence 
or utility.  I believe that this difficulty stems from John Cooper fusing the first 
argument and the second argument together.  Such a conflation will result in 
looking at both arguments as superficially only different in variation and style, 
which is evident in his article “Friendship and the Good in Aristotle.”  For me, 
the conclusion provides the reason for the argument.  To be happy, a person needs 
virtuous friends.  This means that in order to be successful in life, not just friends 
of utility and pleasure are needed; virtuous friends are necessary.  Surely, if a 
person would consider her own character to be excellent, then this is the very 
criterion she will use to measure the character also of other people.  Of course, 
she will not get this by merely looking at a person.  Starting from mere 
acquaintance into a much deeper friendship based on mutual utility or pleasure, 
any relationship can develop into a friendship based on liking the person itself.  
And Aristotle believed that without this kind of relationship, people cannot be 
happy.  As such the argument of John Cooper seems understandable because 
he has the thesis that friendship is not based on selfish motivation.  For him to 
admit that the second argument says that virtuous friends are needed in order 
for a person to be successful is to give up the non-selfish motivation thesis. 
 
                                                 
32  John Cooper, “Friendship and the Good in Aristotle,” in The Philosophical Review, 
86:3 (July 1977), 294.  
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A friend is another self 
 
Aristotle believes that a good person always desires what is good for 
her own self, thus to regard another person as another self 
33 would mean still 
thinking of what is good for oneself, thus rendering the concept to be self-
centered.  I believe that the difficulty lies in interpreting what does the phrase 
other self 
34 mean?  Considering that the idea of self is already difficult to manage 
due to Freudian influences, to introduce the concept of other self seems to be a 
daunting task.  I have a tendency to view this concept either just an extension 
of a personal entity or to look at it through the concept of people having 
similarity in character, commitments, and life’s purposes or ends and therefore 
seen as a unit.
35    Although I am willing to incorporate into the concept of 
other self similarity of thought, I believe that as an extension or being a part of a 
collective is already sufficient for my overall purpose.   This will incorporate also 
what Aristotle said in Book VIII of the NE: 
 
Friendship seems too to hold states together, and 
lawgivers to care more for it than justice; for unanimity 
seems something like friendship, and this they aim at 
most of all, and expel faction as their worst enemy; and 
when men are friends they have no need of justice, while 
when they are just they need friendship as well, and the 
truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality.
36 
 
I believe that Aristotle introduced this concept of other self in order to 
account for how friendship becomes possible in the first place.  In a way, by 
introducing the concept, he is showing how someone who is not related by 
blood, heritage, or sometimes even totally different people, is willing to 
sacrifice and lose everything for the sake of another.  Because what is certain is 
that a good person loves her own existence then maybe, through friendship, 
the other person becomes part of the self.  Aristotle wrote: “Therefore, since 
each of these characteristics belongs to the good man in relation to himself, 
and he is related to his friend as to himself (for his friend is another self), 
friendship too is one of these attributes, and those who have these attributes to 
be friends.”
37  
                                                 
33 ετερον αυτον  (another/second self),  translation mine. 
34 αλλος αυτος  (other self ), translation mine. 
35  Aristotle made use of the analogy of a mother’s sacrifice for her child and a friend’s 
heroism in times of war.   He wrote: “For men think a friend is one who wishes and does what is 
good, or seems so, for the sake of his friend, or one who wishes his friend to exist and live, for 
his sake; which mothers do to their children, and friends do who have come into conflict.  And 
others think a friend is one who lives with and has the same tastes as another, or one who 
grieves and rejoices with his friend; and this too is found in mothers most of all.  It is by some 
one of these characteristics that friendship too is defined” (1166a 3). 
36  NE, 1115a21-25. 
37  Ibid., 1166a30.  
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It is interesting that both passages contain the idea of a friend being 
the other self.  If friendship is just using and being used then the idea of “other 
self” is not necessary.  I believe that by providing the concept of a friend as an 
extension of the self, Aristotle is able to answer the problem that Plato posed 
in the Lysis about the very nature of φίλια.  In the dialogue, Socrates asked: “So 
tell me: when someone loves someone else, which of the two becomes a friend 
of the other, the one who loves or the one who is loved?”38 In Book VIII of 
the NE, Aristotle, in a similar manner, asked whether the word friendship can be 
used to show love for a lifeless object.  Aristotle argues that it is ridiculous to 
consider the relationship between a man and wine as friendship because the 
wine cannot reciprocate the affection that a man gives.  Thus we can see that 
for Aristotle, without reciprocity, there can be no mutual love.  When we say 
that a friend is an extension of the self, we overlook that there are at least two 
parties involved in friendship.  If a friend becomes an extension of the other 
then surely the relationship goes both ways.  What this means is that this shows 
that Aristotle’s view of friendship, although it is self-centered, is not selfish 
after all.  True friendship can only work if both parties will consider first what 
is beneficial for the other.  Although friends in a way use each other, this is 
only so because both are to be considered as the greatest of all external goods.  
This means that for Aristotle, it is in our nature to be used.  This is the reason 
why, by being another self, a friend can do things that we cannot do ourselves.  
They become our proxy in situations we are absent and look for our interest as 
if we are there ourselves.  And this goes both ways.  As such by considering 
what is good and pleasant for our friend, we benefit from it also because our 
friend is also considering what is beneficial to us.  By becoming extensions of 
each other, both become instruments for what is good and pleasant.  And both 
desire this “mutual utility” because both understand that they need each other, 
not just because of the value they give to each other’s company and friendship, 
but more so because everyone needs friends because friends look out for each 
others’ happiness, i.e., eudaimonia.   Regarding the question of altruism, is true 
friendship only concerned about what is best for the other or is it self-centered 
as popularly believed?  I believe that to have the idea of friendship that is 
purely altruistic is impossible.  Even John Cooper recognized that well wishing in 
the incidental kinds of friendships is limited to the retention of pleasure and 
a d v a n t a g e .   B y  m a k i n g  u s e  o f  t h e  i d e a  o f  t h e  other self, friendship  is both 
altruistic and also self-centered.  Without self-love how can a person love a 
friend who is an extension of that same person?  I agree with David Ross who 
holds the view that Aristotle, by introducing the concept of other selves, “was 
trying to break down the antithesis between egoism and altruism by showing 
that the egoism of a good man has just the same characteristics as altruism.” 39  
For John Cooper, there is a problem with this view of friendship.  For 
him, he does not see how the concept of other self answer the question how can 
one call the actions of a friend one’s own?  He wrote: “...the purely verbal 
                                                 
38  John Cooper, ed., The Complete Works of Plato, Stephanus 212b. 
39  David Ross, Aristotle, 6th Ed., (New York: Routledge, 1995), 237.  
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point that, on the ‘other self’ thesis, one can call the actions of a friend ‘one’s 
own’ does not seem to me to add anything to whatever psychological 
plausibility the process as described without it might seem to have.”
40  For him, 
granted that this psychological process is limited only to self-awareness, how 
can one by mirroring himself see one’s faults and shortcomings when all one 
can see is nothing but oneself?  This is the reason why I do not regard this 
concept of other self as psychological in nature, somewhat like an alter ego.  For 
me, the Greek word ετερον αυτον is just a figure of speech,  or a means of 
representing a friend as an extension that can do things for one in proxy or in 
one’s stead, as I have previously mentioned.  If we consider the number of 
experiences that were shared together between friends, a friend as an extension is 
treated exactly just like a member of one’s own family.  This is why Aristotle in 
many instances would use the word στεργω to illustrate the feeling between 
friends just like that of a mother to a child.  The point is that the other self 
concept should not be taken literally or to be interpreted beyond the purpose 
of the analogy.  I believe that if used beyond this purpose it becomes apparent 
why John Cooper would doubt the other self thesis, which, for him,  if affirmed 
it is to accept the view that friendship is self-centered.  As such, he even 
questioned the concept of self-awareness by pointing out that if the reckoning 
point is the self, and the friend is the other self, then how can there be an 
objective view of oneself?
41   
Aside from mutual utility and beneficence, Aristotle also showed what 
is common between friends.  He called this the shared life.  He used the analogy 
of cattle, which just eat, drink, and sleep together but not really share existence.  
He said: “He needs, therefore, to be conscious of the existence of his friend as 
well, and this will be realized in their living together and sharing in discussion 
and thought; for this is what living together would seem to mean in the case of 
man, and not, as in the case of cattle, feeding in the same place.” 42  This means 
that for Aristotle, just doing a common activity is not really sharing in that 
activity.  We might see two people doing one kind of work—together—and yet 
not really be friends.  Although doing the same things repeatedly together may 
be a start of something good.  But what is interesting in this analogy is that 
Aristotle is saying that a person can participate in another person’s conscious 
existence.  Again, I am not referring to anything psychological here a la Freud.   
For me, being conscious of another person’s existence is attainable through 
having similar ideas brought about by conversation and by doing things 
together.  Although in some works Aristotle would use the concept of sameness 
of mind, to the point of saying that a friend has the capability of feeling the pain 
of another friend, I still do not interpret this literally.    By being conscious of 
each other’s existence, for me, means that merely talking with each other and 
doing things together are not enough, although they are necessary in order to 
have a life together.  Elizabeth Tefler pointed this out in her article.  She stated: 
                                                 
40  John Cooper, “Friendship and the Good in Aristotle,” 295. 
41  Ibid., 299. 
42 NE, 1170b10.  
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The 'shared activity' condition, however, is not a sufficient condition for 
friendship. This becomes clear if we imagine a case where the condition is 
fulfilled.  Consider, for example, the situation where two neighbors, each living 
alone, perform services for each other, go to the pictures together, and drop in 
on each other to chat in the evenings. Would we be able to say that the pair 
was friends, simply on the strength of this situation? 43  
I agree with Tefler that while common activity is not a sufficient 
condition for friendship, it is a necessary condition.  Nancy Sherman affirms 
this view.44  According to her, Aristotle in the Eudaimian Ethics, by using the 
technical term προαιρεσις, which means “a reasoned choice that is expressive of 
a character and the overall ends of that character,” a man chooses another 
person as a friend depending on similar sense of commitments and ends.45 
 
But if active loving is a mutual choice with pleasure in 
each other’s acquaintance, it is clear that in general the 
primary friendship is a reciprocal choice of the absolutely 
good and pleasant because it is good and pleasant; and 
this friendship is the habit from which such choice 
springs.46 
 
For Sherman, we choose our friends based on similarity of values and 
objectives.  If we happen to choose friends having different goals and purposes 
sooner or later someone has to give and adapt and conform until similarity in 
views and purposes is established.    I find Sherman’s view more realistic in the 
sense that in real life we really establish friends from the same school, 
organization, club, etc., where people have common experiences.   As such, 
doing similar activities is very important for friendship.  Talking with friends is 
essential, however to say right away that the person I am talking to is a friend is 
absurd.  But if talking to this person becomes a habit and further develops into 
a need then it is a different matter because what do friends do?  Don’t friends 
talk for hours and share things with each other.  If a person is a friend then to 
do common things becomes a necessary condition.  Of course, not all 
friendship is like this.  Sometimes we might not see a childhood friend for so 
many years and yet when we see them, the feeling still remains as if nothing has 
passed.  But what connects both of you as friends are the common activities 
that you did.  Most of the time people become friends without formalizing that 
they are friends.  They just know.  Why?  Because of shared consciousness or 
                                                 
43  Elizabeth Tefler, “XIII – Friendship,” in Proceedings from the Aristotelian Society (1970-
1971), 224. 
44 For Sherman, we choose our friends based on similar commitments and ends.  This 
is contrary to the view that we choose friends first and then their interests and pursuits in life 
follow after the fact.  I find Sherman’s view more realistic in the sense that in real life we really 
establish friends from the same school, organization, club, etc., where people have common 
experiences.   
45  Nancy Sherman, “On Aristotle and the Shared Life,” in Philosophy and 
Phenomemological Research  (1987), 197. 
46  Jonathan Barnes ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle, Bekker No. 1236a30.  
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awareness that both need each other because of the common things that they 
do or have done together.  This is the reason why for Aristotle, the best kind 
of friendship is that of between men who have reached self-sufficiency and 
have been successful in whatever they do, because they have a lot of things in 
common.  He wrote: “Love and friendship therefore are found most and in 
their best form between such men.”
47    Considering the Greek’s patriarchal 
culture where women were regarded as not equal to men, for Aristotle, there is 
no kind of life better than men to live together and spend the rest of days with 
friends.   
To sum up this section, I believe that everything starts from mere 
acquaintance.  It is impossible to see someone like oneself and then just go up 
to that person and call her a friend.  It just does not work that way.  Although, 
one can be a colleague right away because of work, it will take a lot more for 
each other to be called friends.  Once that mutual utility or pleasure is 
established then a shared consciousness and recognition of the fact are 
necessary ingredients for friendship, even only of the incidental kind.   
However, the relationship does not stop there, unless for some unavoidable 
reasons.  Experience tells us that temporary friendships can flourish into a 
much deeper kind.  Although, in all instances, there is mutual well-wishing and 
considering a friend as another self, the friendship that lasts is the one having the 
shared kind of life. 
 
Synthesis and Conclusion 
 
John Cooper by emphasizing well-wishing for the sake of the other 
highlighted the idea that friendship is primarily about being concerned for the 
other.  However, Aristotle did not leave it at that.  He introduced also the 
concept of a friend as the other self, which I emphasized in my paper as another 
self:  pursuing a limited interpretation of a friend as an extension of the self, I 
believe that John Cooper’s well-wishing will be balanced by the other self thesis.  
Although I wish well a friend, being my other self, I am also benefitting from my 
wish.  Friendship is not a one way street; it is and should be reciprocated, as 
such as I wish well a friend, she also wishes me well.  However, to be 
consistent with Aristotle’s virtuous friends even when not reciprocated for any 
reason, a true friend is still a friend because what is being liked is the person 
itself and not her actions or inactions.  Of course, well-wishing for the sake of the 
other captures this but I believe loving a friend as one loves oneself captures it better. 
In conclusion, by analyzing side by side the two arguments used by 
Aristotle in 1169b20—1170b15 of Book IX of the NE, I would have hopefully 
shown that friendship, whether instrumental or intrinsic, is based on mutual 
reciprocity.  Aristotle by making use of the concept of the other self makes 
friendship doing what is best for the other.  But what is good about this formula is 
that it shows that whatever it is you do to your friend you also do to yourself, 
not only because your friend is your extension but also you are an extension to 
                                                 
47  NE, 1158b30.  
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your friend.   This is the reason why in the first argument, Aristotle points out 
that instrumentality goes both ways.  Because of this the self-sufficient friend 
that is able to help out a needy friend, gains something also by being able to 
satisfy her nature as a political person.  In other words, because a friend is an 
allos autos, friends would allow themselves to be used by each other. In the 
second argument, Aristotle goes further.  By pointing out that because life is 
desirable itself, a virtuous friend as an extension of oneself is naturally desirable.  
This means that because of the concept of other self, A knows that B is desirable 
because of the value A gives to B’s own existence.  But what is not that evident 
in the formula of the other self is that B, as another self, is desirable because as A 
values B to the point of wishing what is well for the sake of the other,  B also 
values the same way A.  As such B’s existence is desirable, if and only if A’s is 
desirable as well.  If friendship is based on similarity of character, then 
one is guaranteed reciprocation of well-wishing.48  This is best captured in 
the 1236a10 of the Eudaimian Ethics, where Aristotle wrote:  “So a man 
becomes a friend when he is loved and returns that love, and this is recognized 
by the two men in question.” And for Aristotle, this is necessary for a happy 
life.   
In conclusion, Aristotle, by using the notion of a friend as other self in 
both arguments, makes friendship neither egoistical nor altruistic.  As such, 
friendship because of mutual instrumentality, mutual desirability, and mutual 
reciprocity is a necessary condition in order to have a life that is virtuous and 
happy. 
To explain this concept of synthesizing well-wishing and a friend as the 
other self, I will use two examples commonly used in game theory:  There are 
two farmers, A and B.  Both A and B have the same size of plantation and 
harvest season is upon them.  In order to maximize their profit, they have to 
cooperate and harvest together both of their crops.  The problem is B, after 
harvest, is moving to another country.  If both of them would first harvest A’s 
crops, then it is natural that B’s should follow.  What if they would harvest B’s 
first, what would guarantee that B would stay and help A harvest her 
plantation?   
Another example is the classical prisoner’s dilemma where two suspects 
were arrested by the police.  The police, in order to have sufficient evidence, 
needs confessions from both.  In order to get the optimal result in investigative 
work, both suspects were separated and offered a deal, with the guarantee that 
neither of them will know what the other will confess:  If any one testifies and 
betrays the other, who will in turn just remain silent, the betrayer goes free and 
the silent other will get the full ten-year sentence.  If both remain silent, both 
will receive six-month jail sentences.  If both betray each other, both will get a 
five-year sentence.   
Both examples illustrate what usually happens not only in game theory 
but also in real life.  Both parties in the given example can only maximize their 
                                                 
48 I highlighted this because I believe that this is the solution to the problem of 
altruism and egoism.  
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productivity or minimize punishment only if they cooperate with each other, 
which unfortunately they will not do.  I believe that in both cases any person 
will choose what is natural for any person to do, i.e., not to trust the other.  In 
the case of farmers A and B, for B to push through with any agreement with A 
is not a move consistent with game theory, given that there is nothing to 
compel her to fulfill their agreement.  This is similar to the prisoner’s dilemma.  
Although both will only get six-month jail time only if they cooperate and 
remain silent, both will naturally think that the other person is ratting on the 
other.  So, in this example, both suspects will rat on each other and both will 
get five years.   
I believe that in both examples, while it is self-interest that would 
determine the most optimal outcome, it is also self-interest that would cause 
non-cooperation.  This is the reason why I believe that Aristotle’s concept of 
other self is neither self-centered nor altruistic.  The other self when applied to the 
first example, both A and B will have the resolve to push through with the 
harvest of both plantations because if both will be wishing for what is best for the 
other then both will be thinking of what is beneficial for both.  In fact, if both A 
and B are true friends, which means both have knowledge of each other’s 
character, it will not matter which plantation is harvested first, because no 
matter what, the harvest of both is guaranteed.  In the case of the prisoner’s 
dilemma, if both suspects are genuine friends, in the Aristotelian sense, then 
they will not rat on each other.  Because of the concept of other self, there is 
always the question “how can a person rat on a friend if a friend is part of one 
self?”  Some may think that a suspect because of true friendship might just 
even confess and admit committing the crime alone and thus exonerate the 
other.   While this is consistent with Aristotle’s concept of martyrdom in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, this self-incrimination goes against all modern day game 
theory which is concerned only about maximizing utility.   Accordingly in the 
prisoner’s dilemma, if A and B are true friends, then both will confess 
committing alone the crime.  Both friends, by incriminating their own selves, 
exonerate the other, and by so-doing exonerate their own selves also in the 
process—in the Aristotelian sense, of course. 
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